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Mathematical Models of Games 
of Chance: Epistemological 
Taxonomy and Potential in 
Problem Gambling Research
Cătălin Bărboianu 
Introduction
What is the current place of mathematics in problem gambling research, and how can 
mathematics contribute toward minimizing the harmful effects of excessive gambling? In 
this paper, I answer the first question; then I draw upon the main principles and propose 
further research in the matter of the second question.
First, mathematics is strongly connected to gambling through the mathematical 
models1 underlying any game of chance. Games of chance are developed structurally 
and physically around abstract mathematical models, which are their mere essence, 
and the applications within these mathematical models represent the premises of their 
functionality. For instance, within statistical models, the house edge is ensured through 
precise calculations regarding expected value; if such calculations were not possible, 
the game would never run. Since in the research, treatment, and prevention of problem 
gambling we cannot separate the gambler from the game he plays, it follows that an 
optimal psychological intervention cannot disregard mathematics. Call this the gambling-
math indispensability principle (Bărboianu, 2013b). 
Determinants of the decision to gamble include not only the gambler’s biological 
and psychological constitution, but also the structural characteristics of the gambling 
activity itself (Griffiths, 1993), among which games’ structures are strictly related to the 
mathematical models of the games. Games’ structures directly influence their outcomes in 
an idealized mathematically-modeled way - for instance, outcome volatility (see Turner, 
2011) - and the behavior of outcomes is determinant for gamblers’ decisions.
A second premise is the specificity of the gambling addiction through the goals of the 
player and the monetary reward. Although addiction is a pathological issue (and thus a 
medical one), the existence of the goal of winning distinguishes gambling addiction from 
other types of addiction and relates it to mathematics.
Thus far, the interventions involving mathematics to problem-gamblers were 
limited to didactical interventions, either school based or in experimental research. Past 
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1   I will refer to mathematical model throughout this paper not according to a general use, or to a dictionary/
encyclopedic definition, but to its specific defintion within epistemology of applied mathematics, namely 
the ensamble formed by 1) empirical context idealized as relational structures; 2) structure-preserving maps 
from the empirical structures to the mathematical structures within the governing (mathematical) theory; 3) 
interpretations of the empirical objects and relationships between them within the mathematical structures and 
of the mathematical formal resuls back within the empirical context. Such sense based on structural analogy 
expressed in mathematical terms (iso/homo-morphic structures) is different from the sense of “model” used in 
other disciplines, for instance psychology.
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studies on the impact of a mathematical didactic intervention with gamblers, testing 
whether learning about mathematics of gambling does change gambling behavior, 
were mainly empirical (see Abbott & Volberg, 2000; Gerstein et al., 1999; Hertwig 
et al., 2004; Lambros & Delfabbro, 2007; Pelletier & Ladouceur, 2007; Steenbergh 
et al., 2004; Williams & Connolly, 2006; Peard, 2008; Turner et al., 2008a, 2008b). 
The content of most of the teaching modules fell within Introduction to and Basics 
of Probability and Statistics, covering definition and properties of probability, basics 
of descriptive and inferential statistics, discrete random variables, expected value, 
classical probability distributions, and central limit theorem. The modules were packed 
with examples and applications from games of chance and had lessons dedicated to 
demystifying mathematically the common gambling fallacies. These studies have yielded 
contradictory, non-conclusive results, and many of them tended unexpectedly to answer 
no to the hypothesis that gamblers receiving such specific mathematical education 
show a significant change in gambling behavior after the intervention. These studies 
are problematic from the standpoint of the experimental setup in three important areas: 
sampling, evaluation, and testing of hypotheses (Bărboianu, 2013a); either of these issues 
may provide an explanation for the contradictory results. Aside from these issues, the 
following question arises: What mathematical knowledge would an optimal teaching 
module contain, with respect to the intended effect of limiting excessive gambling? In 
other words, what is missing (if anything) in the current didactic interventions? As I will 
show in this paper, the mathematical models and the act of mathematical modeling in 
gambling hold a potential for providing at least a partial answer to this question through 
further research.
The main goals of this paper are: turning attention of the researchers in this field on 
the mathematical models underlying games of chance and the quantifiable gambling 
activity; an objective classification of these models by epistemological criteria and 
evidentiating a current disinterest on a particular category of models (the functional ones) 
in favor of the statistical models; detecting a potential of all these mathematical models to 
contribute in problem gambling prevention and treatment (as generating a particular kind 
of knowledge – the epistemic knowledge – related to and deriving from these models and 
the act of mathematical modeling).
I begin by identifying two main categories of mathematical models – statistical & 
probabilistic and functional – which represent games and any quantifiable gambling 
activity; then I discuss the prevalence of models of the first category in the interest of all 
parties involved in the study of gambling – researchers, game producers and operators, 
and players. 
I then go on to analyze the content categories and basic structure of gambling-
mathematics knowledge available to be taught, which is identifiable around the 
mathematical models. I call attention to the epistemic knowledge, which is attached to 
the mathematical concepts per se, but also to the functions of a mathematical model, 
especially that of representation. Next, I argue for the potential of this epistemic 
knowledge in both didactical and cognitive interventions to gamblers. For the clinical 
cognitive interventions, I suggest the use of the reduction-to-models principle in 
conjunction with the facing-the-odds principle for an objective representation (of games 
of chance and gambling) as basic mathematical models free of gaming risk factors2, 
begging for further theoretical and empirical research within psychology which to 
establish their effectiveness and actual implementation. 
2   In the sense of the definition from note 1, “free of” in the mathematical-modeling context refers to the 
idealization for the various purposes within the mathematical model.
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Mathematical models of games of chance and gambling
Games of chance are developed in their physical consumer-ready form on the basis 
of mathematical models, which stand as the premises of their existence and represent 
their physical processes (Bărboianu, 2013b). As an example (of physical-process 
representation), roulette betting is represented as follows: 
outcome of a game. The value of function BW  is called the profit of bet B (Bărboianu, 
2007). For each bet B, function BW  may take negative or non-negative values. The 
profit function expresses the net amount the player wins or loses after the spin as a result 
of the player’s bet (applying the convention that profit can also be negative, that is, a 
loss). This formal system is part of a mathematical model of the roulette game (there is 
more than one model involved in the game of roulette) representing some of the physical 
processes of betting, namely chip placements and their overall financial result after the 
spin. Using the mathematical structure of the bet space and the properties of the profit 
function, a relation of equivalence between bets can be defined; in the real world, the 
relation represents a natural financial equivalence between bets. The inferred properties 
of the equivalence of the bets in the mathematical model yield criteria of optimization of 
roulette betting with respect to personal money and time management3. 
Mathematical models can additionally represent gambling systems related to several 
plays, several games, and generally any quantifiable gambling activity. For instance, still 
from roulette, the Martingale system (keeping the same bet and raising its stake with the 
same multiplier successively until the first success) is modeled through a geometrical 
progression whose partial sums of terms obey a certain inequality, which in fact ensure 
an overall positive profit when a bet is won. In the Martingale example, not only do we 
have a representation of a physical process (the described betting system) through a 
mathematical model, but also a mathematical explanation (through the same model) of 
the trust this roulette system is granted by gamblers4.
 
Probabilistic and statistical models and functional models
Games of chance and gambling as a quantifiable activity are represented in applied 
mathematics through specific mathematical models which can be distinguished through 
two main categories with respect to the purposes they serve, which I call: 
 1. Probabilistic and statistical models 
 2. Functional models
While probabilistic and statistical models serve for the applications related to the 
games’ outcomes occurring under conditions of uncertainty, functional models serve to 
cognitive interventions, I suggest the use of the reduction-to-models principle in 
conjunction with the facing-the-odds principle for an objective representation (of games 
of chance and gambling) as basic mathematical models free of gaming risk factors2, 
begging for further theoretical and empirical research within psychology which to 
establish their effectiveness and actual implementation.  
 
Mathematical models of games of chance and gambling 
 
Games of chance are developed in their phy ical consumer-ready form on the 
basis of mathematical models, which stand as the premises of their existence and 
re rese t their physical processes (Bărboianu, 2013b). As an example (of physical-
process representation), roulette betting is represented as follows:  
A roulette (complex) bet is defined as a finite family  , ,i i i i IB A p s  , where iA  
is a subset of the set R of roulette numbers, which allows a single placement according to 
the configuration of the roulette table (such as for straight, split, corner column, color bet, 
etc.), ip  is the payout of iA , and 0is  is the stake of the placement iA . All bets B so 
defined form the bet space. Then, for each bet B, a profit function BW  is defined as 
follows: R:WB R,      


Ii
iAAiB peeseW ii ]111[ , where R is the set of real 
numbers and A1  is the characteristic function of set A. Variable e R  stands for the 
outcome of a game. The value of function B  is called the profit of bet B (Bărboianu, 
2007). For each bet B, function BW  may take negative or non-negative values. The profit 
function expresses the net amount the player wins or loses after the spin as a result of the 
player’s bet (applying the convention that profit can also be negative, that is, a loss). This 
formal system is part of a mathematical model of the roulette game (there is more than 
one model involved in the game of roulette) representing some of the physical processes 
of betting, namely chip placements and their overall financial result after the spin. Using 
the mathematical structure of the bet space and the properties of the profit function, a 
relation of equivalence between bets can be defined; in the real world, the relation 
represents a natural financial equivalence between bets. The inferred properties of the 
equivalence of the bets in the mathematical model yield criteria of optimization of 
roulette betting with respect to personal money and time management3.  
Mathematical models can additionally represent gambling systems related to 
several plays, several games, and generally any quantifiable gambling activity. For 
instanc , still fro  roulette, the Martingale system (keeping the same bet and raising its 
stake with the same multiplier successiv ly until the first success) is modeled through a 
geometrical progression whose partial sums of term obey a certain inequality, which in 
fact en ure an ov rall positive profit when a bet is won. In the Martingale example, not 
o ly do we have a representation of a physical process (the described betting system) 
                                                 
2 In the sense of the definition from note 1, “free of” in the mathematical-modeling context refers 
to the idealization for the various purposes within the mathematical model. 
3 This mathematical model of a roulette bet can be generalized and adapted further to other types 
of bets specific to other games. 
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through a mathematical model, but also a mathematical explanation (through the same 
model) of the trust this roulette system is granted by gamblers4. 
  
Probabilistic and s atistical models and functional models 
 
Games of chance and gambling as a quantifiable activity are represented in 
applied mathematics through specific mathematic l models which can be distinguished 
through two main categories with respect to the purposes they serve, which I call: 
1. Probabilistic and statistical models 
2. Functional models 
While probabilistic and statistical models serve for the applications related to the 
games’ outcomes occurring under conditions of uncertainty, functional models serve to 
represent the physical systems and processes that make the games actually function as 
well as for applications related to the functioning. 
As examples, computing the probability of hitting a specific number or at least a 
specific quantity of winning numbers at a specific lottery is workable within a 
probabilistic mod l, which assumes establishi g the right probability field within which 
to work with the appropriate discrete probability distribution. Computi g t tistical 
means and errors (i  the statistical sense) is workable within a st tistical model by 
establishing the distribution of the rando  variable which describes t e outcome and 
using mathematical means and measures such as expected value, deviation, dis ersion, or 
variance. Card movement in poker is described through a functional model deal g with 
combinations of symbols and values e ific to cards. Roul tte complex bets are 
presented in a functional model as elements of a mathematical structure with vectorial 
and topologic l features. Paylines of a multilin  slot machine ar  presented a  lines in a 
Cartesia  grid or path  i  a graph, and their utual independence is described through 
t pological proper ies, all these still within a functional model (Bărboianu, 2013c). 
Below are the purpo es and mathematical governing theories5 involved in each of 
the two categories of m th tical mode s used i  gambling. 
1. Probabilistic nd statistical mod l . Purpos s: quantific tion of the g mbling 
uncerta nty, me suring risk and possib lity, prediction, computation of th  par meters 
charac erizing game , of the me ns and statistical errors, providing practical statist s 
(coll ct ons of data), o timization, providing tra eg  and optimal play. Governing 
theories: Measure Theory, Probab lity T e ry, Mathematical Statistics, Real Analysis, 
Decision Theory. 
2. Functional models. Purposes: scription f t  gaming processes and of the 
functioning f the games, optimization, providing strategy and optimal play, providing 
the necessary theoretical support for the probabilistic and statistical models. Governing 
                                                 
4 Still, the Martingale system fails, in certain specific instances, against practical factors such as 
consuming the entire fund available before the winning bet, low profit rates, or generally against 
the probability laws, which always favor the house over the player in the long run, no matter the 
gambling system used. 
5 Applying to existent games of chance. Other mathematical theories may be included in the 
future with the development of other types of games as well as with the development of pure 
mathematics itself. 
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represented in a functional model as elements of a mathematical structure with vectorial 
and topological features. Paylines of a multiline slot machine are represented as lines in a 
Cartesian grid or paths in a graph, and their mutual independence is described through 
topological properties, all these still within a functional model (Bărboianu, 2013c). 
Below are the purposes and mathematical governing theories5 involved in each of 
the two categories of mathematical models used in gambling. 
1. Probabilistic and statistical models. Purposes: quantification of the gambling 
uncertainty, measuring risk and possibility, prediction, computation of the parameters 
characterizing games, of the means and statistical errors, providing practical statistics 
(collections of data), optimization, providing strategy and optimal play. Governing 
theories: Measure Theory, Probability Theory, Mathematical Statistics, Real Analysis, 
Decision Theory. 
2. Functional models. Purposes: description of the gaming processes and of the 
functioning of the games, optimization, providing strategy and optimal play, providing 
the necessary theoretical support for the probabilistic and statistical models. Governing 
                                                 
4 Still, the Martingale system fails, in certain specific instances, against practical factors such as 
consuming the entire fund available before the winning bet, low profit rates, or generally against 
the probability laws, which always favor the house over the player in the long run, no matter the 
gambling system used. 
5 Applying to existent games of chance. Other mathematical theories may be included in the 
future with the development of other types of games as well as with the development of pure 
mathematics itself. 
represent the physical systems and processes that make the games actually function as 
well as for applications related to the functioning.
As examples, computing the probability of hitting a specific number or at least 
a specific quantity of winning numbers at a specific lottery is workable within a 
probabilistic model, which assumes establishing the right probability field within which 
to work with the appropriate discrete probability distribution. Computing statistical 
means and errors (in the statistical sense) is workable within a statistical model by 
establishing the distribution of the random variable which describes the outcome and 
using mathematical means and measures such as expected value, deviation, dispersion, 
or variance. Card movement in poker is describ d through a functi al model dealing 
with combinations of ymbols and value specific to cards. Roulette complex bets are 
represented in a functional model as elements of a mathematical structure with vectorial 
and topologic l fea ures. Paylines of a multiline slot machine are represented as lines in 
a Cartesian grid or paths in a graph, and their mutual independence is described through 
topologic l properties, all these still within a f nctional model (Bărboianu, 2013c).
Below are the purposes and mathematical governing theories5 involved in each of the 
two categories of mathematical models used in gambling.
1. Probabilistic and statistical models. Purposes: quantification of the gambling 
uncertainty, measuring risk and possibility, prediction, computation of the parameters 
characterizing games, of the means and statistical errors, providing practical statistics 
(collections of data), optimization, providing strategy and optimal play. Governing 
theories: Measure Theory, Probability Theory, Mathematical Statistics, Real Analysis, 
Decision Theory.
2. Functional models. Purposes: description of the gaming processes and of the 
functioning of the games, optimization, providing strategy and optimal play, providing 
the necessary theoretical support for the probabilistic and statistical models. Governing 
theories: Set Theory, Combinatorics, Number Theory, Algebra, Topology, Geometry, 
Graph Theory, Real Analysis. 
A game and the gambling activity related to that game are represented by several 
mathematical models, each of them serving a purpose for the applied mathematician. 
This multimodel feature holds even for the same subcategory of models. For instance, 
computing the strength of a poker hand in terms of probabilities assumes establishing 
several different probability fields for the events related to one’s own hand and those 
events of type “at least one” related to the opponents’ hands, which means a different 
probabilistic model for each application. Every game of chance is represented by models 
from both the first and second categories, even though a model from the latter category 
may be trivial. This happens because outcomes and uncertainty are specific to games of 
chance by definition (thus explaining the exi tence f first-c tegory models) and every 
probabilistic/statistical model need  a functional model in order o ensure the grounding 
mathematical structures necessary for the governing theories of the probabilistic/
statistical model to be applied. For example, any probability co putation withi  a 
probabilistic model n eds a priori a grounding model representing the gaming events 
to be measur d, which must belong to a Boolean structure, and this latter model is a 
functional one.
 
Prevalence of the probabilistic and statistical models.
There is a prevalence of models of the first category in the interest of all parties 
involved in the study of gambling – researchers, game producers and operators, and 
players. This prevalence is explainable first through the fact that these mod ls provide 
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measures, estimations, and predictions for the financial results of the gambling activity, 
which in turn generate the most important indicators for the commercial aspect of the 
phenomenon. These models actually provide game producers and operators with a 
mathematical “guarantee” that a certain game can be run with no risk of ruin for the 
house over the long run; for the players, probabilities and statistical indicators are the 
most important mathematical criteria in making gaming decisions. Second, games of 
chance have simple processes of functioning. For commercial reasons, they are designed 
to be as undemanding as possible with straightforward sets of rules and short timeframes 
of the sessions; according to this uncomplicated design, the functional models 
representing them are usually simple, sometimes trivial (unlike other types of games – 
for instance strategy games such as chess – whose complexity is modeled through richer 
mathematical models). There are also exceptions to this functional-model-simplicity 
rule –  that is, games whose apparently simple functioning hides complex mathematical 
models. Such is the case with roulette betting, in which complex bets are represented 
as elements of a mathematical structure generating vectorial and topological spaces and 
classes of equivalence within which various further applications can be developed. This 
exception applies also to multiline slots, where probability applications related to groups 
of paylines rely on a representation of the display as part of a discrete mathematical 
structure (Cartesian grid or graph) generating a metric space (and implicitly a topology), 
within which properties such as connection, neighboring, and independence are defined 
to serve the probabilistic models (Bărboianu, 2013c).
This prevalence of the models of the first category in the study of gambling is 
also reflected in the content of the existent courses of gambling mathematics – either 
experimental or school based – where gambling is presented exclusively as a plain, 
direct application of Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics. As I shall argue 
further in this paper, considering all the mathematical models behind a game of chance 
– even having those of the second category limited to the functions of representation 
and description – as well as the act of modeling itself can enhance any didactical 
mathematical intervention or a psychological cognitive intervention.
Epistemic knowledge and mathematical knowledge
Representation and explanation, along with prediction are the main functions of 
a mathematical model in physical sciences, among other functions like description, 
optimization, measuring, approximation, or simulation (Newton & al, 1990; Morton, 
1993; Saatsi, 2011), and those functions also apply to the study of games and gambling. 
Mathematical modeling is the main mean of inference in science, and modern to 
contemporary accounts of the role of mathematics in scientific explanation of physical 
phenomena have argued for its indispensability (see Quine, 1981; Colyvan, 1998; Baker, 
2009; Saatsi, 2011). The inference based on mathematical models, which is the core 
method of scientific reasoning, is possible first because mathematics is a rich source of 
structures, and second because of the representation function of a mathematical model, 
which allows mathematical structures to be recognized as embedded in the physical 
world. Such inference works in three steps (immersion, derivation and interpretation, 
where the first and third steps assume establishing mappings from the empirical setup 
to a convenient mathematical structure), in terms of Bueno and Colyvan’s (2011) 
inferential conception of mathematical modeling, an extension of Pincock’s (2004) 
mapping account. The mapping account establishes isomorphic or homomorphic 
relations6 between mathematical structures from within a mathematical theory and 
mathematical structures recognized in the idealized physical system (Pincock, 2004; 
Bueno & Colyvan, 2011). This iso/homo-morphic feature of the mapping account 
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method of scientific reasoning, is possible first because mathematics is a rich source of 
structures, and second because of the representation function of a mathematical model, 
which allows mathematical structures to be recognized as embedded in the physical 
world. Such inference works in three steps (immersion, derivation and interpretation, 
where the first and third steps assume establishing mappings from the empirical setup to a 
convenient mathematical structure), in terms of Bueno and Colyvan’s (2011) inferential 
conception of mathematical modeling, an extension of Pincock’s (2004) mapping 
account. The mapping account establishes isomorphic or homomorphic relations6 
between mathematical structures from within a mathematical theory and mathematical 
structures recognized in the idealized physical system (Pincock, 2004; Bueno & Colyvan, 
2011). This iso/homo-morphic feature of the mapping account justifies epistemologically 
the infere ce based on the mathematical model. The practical execution of the three steps 
above is the object of applied mathematics, and the setup of th  mappings from steps 1 
and 3 is called mathematical modeling.  
  Mathematical modeling and th  inference based on models, although they 
provide the central method of investigation in scienc , re su ject to epist mic questions, 
criticisms, and claims related to ontology, causality, truth, and trustworthiness. For 
instance, modeli g assumption  (which revert to ide lizi  the physical system) are 
generally false rel tive to a standard governing theory, a d the need for a model usually 
arises from some unmanageability of this governing theory. These assumptions are far 
from arbitrary, being made on the basis of physical intuition, inductive reasoning, and 
intelligent guesswork (Morton, 1993). Bas van Fraasen (2004) treats the mathematical 
model as a mediating model of convenience, something we adopt only because we are 
not capable of managing the empirical facts in their totality in any other way.  
                                                 
6 In algebraic categories, a homorphism is a structure-preserving map in terms of relations 
between the objects of the structures. If the map is bijective, it is called isomorphism. 
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justifies epistemologically the inference based on the mathematical model. The practical 
execution of the three steps above is the object of applied mathematics, and the setup of 
the mappings from steps 1 and 3 is called mathematical modeling. 
Mathematical modeling and the inference based on models, although they provide 
the central method of investigation in science, are subject to epistemic questions, 
criticisms, and claims related to ontology, causality, truth, and trustworthiness. For 
instance, modeling assumptions (which revert to idealizing the physical system) are 
generally false relative to a standard governing theory, and the need for a model usually 
arises from some unmanageability of this governing theory. These assumptions are far 
from arbitrary, being made on the basis of physical intuition, inductive reasoning, and 
intelligent guesswork (Morton, 1993). Bas van Fraasen (2004) treats the mathematical 
model as a mediating model of convenience, something we adopt only because we are 
not capable of managing the empirical facts in their totality in any other way. 
These topics illustrate just a small portion of the subjects of debates among 
philosophers of science regarding epistemic issues raised by mathematical models 
and the inferences based on them. All knowledge related to the applicability of the 
mathematical models to physical systems, including the act of modeling itself and the 
debating of the issues above, is epistemic knowledge7. 
Coming now to the mathematical knowledge that a mathematical model carries, 
this knowledge is not limited to the mathematical theories where the derivation step 
takes place, (such knowledge can be categorized as pure mathematics knowledge), 
but this mathematical knowledge extends to the applications within these theories 
(particularizations), the final applications in terms of the initial physical system 
(interpretations), which can then be categorized as applied mathematics knowledge.
Gambling-mathematics knowledge and related epistemic knowledge
The structure of gambling-mathematics knowledge can be identified entirely 
within and around the mathematical models of games and gambling, because all the 
mathematical actions, facts, and information related to gambling are derived exclusively 
from these models. 
First, the mathematical (governing) theories or parts of them addressed specifically 
to gambling (that the models use in the derivation step) contain formal systems, 
propositions, and theorems, and the logical flow between them yields the  theoretical 
results of any gambling-mathematics application. All this theoretical knowledge is pure-
mathematics knowledge, which is accessible to and manageable by gamblers with a high 
level of mathematical education.
Second, the general applications that set up the specific theoretical framework 
and limit the mathematical theories to the modeling needs of each game in part (the 
theoretical support of what we usually call the mathematics of roulette, of blackjack, of 
poker, and so on) are included in applied-mathematics knowledge, still theoretical, and 
still accessible to and manageable by gamblers with a level of mathematical education 
lower than the pure-math one, but still high.
 These topics illustrate just a mall ortion of the subjects of d bates among 
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mathematical actions, facts, and information related to gambling are derived exclusively 
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First, the mathematical (governing) theories or parts of them addressed 
specifically to gambling (that the models use in the derivation step) contain formal 
systems, propositions, and theorems, and the logical flow between them yields the  
theoretical results of any gambling-mathematics application. All this theoretical 
knowledge is pure-mathematics knowledge, which is accessible to and manageable by 
gamblers with a high level of mathematical education. 
Second, the general applications that set up the specific theoretical framework and 
limit the mathematical theories to the modeling needs of each game in part (the 
theoretical support of what we usually call the mathematics of roulette, of blackjack, of 
poker, and so on) are included in applied-mathematics knowledge, still theoretical, and 
still accessible to and manageable by gamblers with a level of mathematical education 
lower than the pure-math one, but till high. 
Finally, t  results of practical applicatio s specific for each game or any 
quantifiable gambling activity, obtained through particularizati ns of the general 
applications and computations, yielding pr ctical and numerical results such as game 
parameters, approximations, odds, statistical indicators, directions of optimization and 
recomme dations, still fall within the applied-mathematics knowledge category; 
                                                
7 Epistemic knowledge is that knowledge acquired from the field of Epistemology, which gathers 
the various theories of knowledge (what is knowledge, how knowledge is acquired, how concepts 
like belief and truth relate to the objective knowledge and what is their place in the rational 
judgements, etc.). Epistemology has a diffuse border with Philosophy of Science. For instance, 
the epistemology of mathematical models and modeling falls within the latter. Naturalists such as 
W.O. Quine take epistemology to be a branch of psychology (Quine, 1969). The concerns of the 
epistemology of mathematical models and modeling are: rational justifications of the use of 
mathematical models, issues of construction and representation, functions of the models, the 
relationships of the models as abstract things with the real world, the acquirement of knowledge 
through models, the nature of this knowledge, various other issues concerning the dichotomy 
abstract-empirical. Each category of mathematical model raises specific epistemological issues. 
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Finally, the results of practical applications specific for each game or any 
quantifiable gambling activity, obtained through particularizations of the general 
applications and computations, yielding practical and numerical results such as game 
parameters, approximations, odds, statistical indicators, directions of optimization 
and recommendations, still fall within the applied-mathematics knowledge category; 
however, they are accessible to and manageable by gamblers with lower levels of 
mathematical education, under the condition of being properly defined, presented, and 
explained, not simply delivered as plain information.
This pure and applied gambling mathematics knowledge (hereafter abbreviated as 
PAGMK) may be acquired by gamblers via instructional means (gambling-mathematics 
courses in schools or private organizations, experimental interventions) or specific 
media (books, journals, magazines, and websites). Of course, the structure and content 
of such gambling-mathematics resources vary, and the existent courses usually follow 
the curricula of regular Introduction to/Basics of Probability and Statistics classes in 
post-secondary schools, with the focus on applications of these disciplines in gambling. 
Regarding the latter category of resources, the plethora of popular literature on gambling 
mathematics published in the last two decades raises the necessity of critical selection 
and professional certification when it comes to a recommendation (Turner et al., 2003). 
This is because such commercial publications serve various scopes, wide or narrow, and 
the information delivered by them can be useful even if  incomplete, but also misleading 
(as is the case with most of the so-called “how to win” or “strategy” titles, in which the 
mathematical information or systems described are not mathematical at all). In any case, 
credentials of the authors and publishers of such publications must be verified.
Coming now to the epistemic knowledge related to gambling mathematics, it can 
be found surrounding PAGMK, as mathematical knowledge is itself one of the objects 
of epistemology (Colyvan, 2012). Every mathematical concept and mathematical act 
generates epistemic knowledge regarding ontology, truth, explanation, interpretation, 
and critique, and this also applies to the particular field of PAGMK. A relevant example 
is the epistemic knowledge attached to the concept of probability, which is the central 
mathematical concept around which gambling mathematics revolves. It happens that 
probability is one of the mathematical concepts highly predisposed to philosophical 
interpretation, questions regarding existence, and how probability represents the 
empirical world of uncertainty (Dubucs, 2010). 
Past and current courses on the mathematics of gambling, either in the curricula 
of some schools or in experimental didactic interventions in problem gambling 
research, lack epistemic components. I argue in a forthcoming paper that these missing 
components would enhance any didactic intervention or psychological intervention—or a 
mixture of these—with respect to achieving the goal of preventing and limiting excessive 
gambling. Furthermore, this issue suggests a possible explanation for the contradictory 
results of previous empirical studies on whether learning about the mathematics of 
gambling does, in fact, change gambling behavior. For the current paper, I restrict my 
arguments toward the side of clinical cognitive interventions.
How mathematical models were considered thus far in gambling
Statistical and probabilistic models are of interest to players on one hand, because 
of their function of prediction under uncertainty and because they offer mathematical 
measures and indicators that are seen as the only stable “certain” facts in an uncertain 
experimental environment such as gambling. On the other hand, those models concerned 
researchers of various profiles, for the same reason, and also for the reasons that 
motivated their prevalence I talked about in a previous section of this paper. 
Among such researchers, problem gambling specialists developed and tested 
mathematical teaching modules applicable to gamblers. These modules include 
knowledge attached to these particular models. The aim of such knowledge was to limit 
24 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 19 Issue 1
Spring 2015
excessive gambling through a better understanding of the probabilistic/statistical facts of 
the games and gambling. Such modules, however, barely touched knowledge attached to 
the functional models and lacked entirely the epistemic knowledge related to PAGMK.
It worth mentioning here two contributions to the cognitive assets of gamblers with 
respect to gambling mathematics, namely the Harvard Medical School’s Division on 
Addictions’ module called Facing the Odds: The Mathematics of Gambling and Other 
Risks (Shaffer & Vander Bilt, 1996) and Centre for Addiction and Mental Health’s 
curriculum called Youth making choices: Gambling Prevention Program (Turner & al., 
2010), two middle-school curricula on probability, statistics and number sense designed 
to increase young people’s mathematics literacy while concurrently preventing or 
reducing their participation in risky and potentially addictive behaviors. More oriented 
on practical (empirical) statistics, works of K. Harrigan (2009), N. Turner (1998, 2011), 
and Turner & al. (2003) on the statistical indicators of the games in relation to their 
mathematical design and real outcomes also contributed to these assets.
Facing the odds is in fact a principle that has been tested. Probability, as the central 
concept of gambling mathematics, ought to receive greatest attention. However, facing 
is not enough and the studies mentioned at the end of the previous section (following 
the publication and application of the module) confirmed that premise. More knowledge 
related to the concept of probability is required beyond the standard curricula, which 
points out that if we teach the mathematics of gambling with the goal of changing 
gambling behavior, we must do it in a different manner, with respect to both content and 
approach, from the customary methodology.
Another category of researchers (statisticians, economists, psychologists, etc.) 
focusing on statistical and probabilistic models are those who study the games with 
regard to their outcomes and economic impact, and the gambling phenomenon as a social 
issue.
Functional models were ignored in the field of problem gambling; they concerned 
mostly the gaming mathematicians who model and study the games and gambling in 
depth, as well as the math-inclined players, who see the inner mathematical facts of the 
games as necessary mainly to improve playing skills and strategy and to get knowledge 
on optimal play8. 
 
The potential of the mathematical models in psychological cognitive interventions
I identified two main elements related to mathematical models and the act of modeling 
that will potentially have positive effects in a non-standard psychological intervention 
using them: 1) the epistemic knowledge attached to PAGMK; and 2) the placement of the 
gaming risk factors with respect to the mathematical models, for whose potential I argue 
in this section.
The potential of the epistemic knowledge attached to PAGMK
Epistemic knowledge is active knowledge, in sense that it is followed in the learner’s 
mind by mental processes not limited to the object of learning, but relating to other 
objects, going into adjacent disciplines, and interposing the personal psychological 
background of established knowledge, beliefs, and methods of investigation. Such 
processes are questioning, critiquing, transforming, adapting, and accommodating with 
contradictory knowledge or beliefs previously assimilated. Thus, epistemic knowledge 
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8 Both terms strategy and optimal play do not have an absolute character in sense of practical 
results. Any gaming strategy is relative by definition, as relating to the personal goals of the 
player, which can also be subjective. An optimal play can be mathematically defined and 
provided for several games, however the optimal play does not guarantee any ultimate winning, 
as the practical results still obey the general probability laws, and the optimal play involves 
criteria based on probability. The same limitation applies for a strategy. 
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implies psychological processes of a higher intensity and number than in the case of 
the standard taught knowledge, and consequently the inclusion of epistemic knowledge 
in a cognitive intervention will establish a highly active psychological background 
for the student, who will become more receptive and connected to the psychological 
components of the intervention. This is a first general argument in favor of epistemic 
knowledge.
Another general argument is the reinforcement of critical thinking. Critical thinking 
is recognized in the literature on scholastic education as an important positive factor 
in the educational assessment and the quality of learning (see Ennis, 1993; Pithers & 
Soden, 2000). A similar attribute of critical thinking also applies in problem gambling 
(Turner et al., 2008): studies have found that prevention of excessive gambling, based on 
didactical/cognitive interventions focusing on improving the gambler’s critical thinking 
on issues related to randomness, probability, and statistics, with the effect of correcting 
gambling misconceptions and fallacies, tends to have practical effects expressed through 
the decrease of gambling activity of the subjects of the interventions (Gerstein et al., 
1999; Abbot & Volberg, 2000). Taught mathematics develops over time a mathematical 
thinking of the student (Jaworski, 2006; Aizikovitsh & Amit, 2010) and mathematical 
thinking is per se critical thinking in ongoing development (see Tall, 1991, 1995; 
Dreyfus & Eisenberg, 1996).
Given the wide critical component of epistemic knowledge (Ichikawa & Steup, 
2013) (through ideas related to pragmatism, skepticism, justification, scientific truth, 
etc.), the inclusion of epistemic knowledge in a didactical/cognitive intervention on 
gambling mathematics would just enlarge the volume of knowledge that can develop 
critical thinking during the process of learning. Since critical thinking is something that 
is developed rather than directly taught (Siegel, 1989), enlarging the volume of taught 
knowledge through the addition of epistemic knowledge would consequently increase 
the development of critical thinking in both intensity and duration (of the sessions). 
In particular, cognitive interventions using epistemic knowledge attached to the 
concept of probability – for instance, familiarizing the learner with other scientific 
interpretations of probability9, and with the epistemic knowledge connected to 
the scientific design of the mathematical probability and of each of the scientific 
interpretations of probability individually and connected to the way these formal 
accounts represent the physical reality – will potentially10 help the gambler to distinguish 
between probability and physical possibility, by taking probability as a mathematical or 
pseudo-mathematical non-absolute measure of possibility, understanding that probability 
measures only events belonging to ideal structures that only approximate reality through 
representation. This distinction between probability and possibility is also facilitated by 
the knowledge about the existence of various scientific interpretations of probability, 
which can play a role in correcting gambling fallacies and adopting critical thinking. 
There is a natural non-formal interpretation and development of the concept 
of probability for every gambler, just as there is for any other formalized concept, 
resulting from the natural cognitive processes of observation, generalization, and 
abstraction (Murphy, 2004). This personal interpretation, which depends on each 
psychological profile, might match partially or totally – consciously or not – one of the 
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9 To cite the classical scientific interpretations of probability, we mention Laplace’s account for 
classical probability, Carnap’s for logical probability, Ramsey’s and de Finetti’s for subjective 
probability, Venn, de Finetti and von Mises for frequential probability, and Popper’s and Pierce’s 
for propensitic probability. 
interpretations of probability individually nd con ected to the way these formal accou ts 
represent the physical reality – will potentially10 help the gambler to distinguish between 
probability and physical possibility, by taking probability as a mathematical or pseudo-
mathematical non-abs lute me sure of possibility, understanding that probability 
measures only events belonging t  ideal structures t at only approximate reality through 
representation. This distinction between probability and possibility is also facilitated by 
the knowledge about the existence of various scientific interpretations of probability, 
which can play a role in correcting gambling fallacies and adopting critical thinking.  
There is a natural non-formal interpretation and development of the concept of 
probability for every gambler, just as there is for any other formalized concept, resulting 
from the natural cognitive processes of observation, generalization, and abstraction 
(Murphy, 2004). This personal interpretation, which depends on each psychological 
profile, might match partially or totally – consciously or not – one of the scientific 
interpretations of probability. In this natural interpretation, the gambler takes probability 
to be an objective measure, while assigning it for a personal (subjective, non-
mathematical) degree of belief in the occurrence of an event. Depending on the gambler’s 
mathematical education, but also on his/her psychological profile, the concepts of 
measure and event may be interpreted in various senses, some of them pseudo-
mathematical (for example, one can take the measure as obeying only the additivity 
axiom, or one can refer to event, even though said event does not belong to a Boolean 
structure, and still assign it a probability).   
For instance, there are gamblers who take the probability of an event as being the 
relative frequency of the occurrence of that event in past experimental setups which were 
conducted under the same conditions; this perception matches the finite frequentist 
interpretation of probability. It can be assumed that these are persons who rely on 
practical (past) statistics, implicitly on physical evidence (since relative frequency refers 
to experiments that have already happened and whose utcomes were r gistered; by 
contrast, mathematical probability r fers t  infinite series of experiments, most of them in 
t  future). Such a gambler might be a prudent person a d migh  te d to t ust the odds 
calculators b sed n partial simulations. (Empirical tudy is required to tes  this 
hypothesis.) Despite prudence, the finit  frequentist gambler might b predis osed to 
gambling fallacies and erroneous beliefs more than other pro iles when s/he establishes 
hi /her own degr e of belief on th  basis of relative f eque cy. Fo  instance,  fallacy 
occurs when assigning a “probability” – based on partial simulations give  by an odds 
calculator whose base of records is still small – to a rare/frequent (in sense of 
mathematical probability) event;  this approach can yield a big difference (positive or 
negative) between that “probability” and the real mathematical probability. 
As another example, there might be gamblers who see the probability of an event 
as a physical property of the experimental setup, that is, its tendency to yield the 
                                                 
10 The potential is given by the mere content of such knowledge. The real aimed effects of an 
intervention which includes epistemic knowledge would manifest only if certain practical 
conditions are met regarding the entire design of the learning module and process (content, 
structure, differentiation, and accommodation with the student’s level of mathematical 
knowledge, etc.). The real effects can be detected only through empirical studies on the students 
after the intervention.   
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scientific interpretations of probability. In this natural interpretation, the gambler takes 
probability to be an objective measure, while assigning it for a personal (subjective, 
non-mathematical) degree of belief in the occurrence of an event. Depending on the 
gambler’s mathematical education, but also on his/her psychological profile, the concepts 
of measure and event may be interpreted in various senses, some of them pseudo-
mathematical (for example, one can take the measure as obeying only the additivity 
axiom, or one can refer to event, even though said event does not belong to a Boolean 
structure, and still assign it a probability).  
For instance, there are gamblers who take the probability of an event as being the 
relative frequency of the occurrence of that event in past experimental setups which 
were conducted under the same conditions; this perception matches the finite frequentist 
interpretation of probability. It can be assumed that these are persons who rely on 
practical (past) statistics, implicitly on physical evidence (since relative frequency refers 
to experiments that have already happened and whose outcomes were registered; by 
contrast, mathematical probability refers to infinite series of experiments, most of them 
in the future). Such a gambler might be a prudent person and might tend to trust the 
odds calculators based on partial simulations. (Empirical study is required to test this 
hypothesis.) Despite prudence, the finite frequentist gambler might be predisposed to 
gambling fallacies and erroneous beliefs more than other profiles when s/he establishes 
his/her own degree of belief on the basis of relative frequency. For instance, a fallacy 
occurs when assigning a “probability” – based on partial simulations given by an 
odds calculator whose base of records is still small – to a rare/frequent (in sense of 
mathematical probability) event;  this approach can yield a big difference (positive or 
negative) between that “probability” and the real mathematical probability.
As another example, there might be gamblers who see the probability of an event as a 
physical property of the experimental setup, that is, its tendency to yield the occurrence 
of that event or a certain relative frequency of such an occurrence. In other words, the 
fact that the (mathematical) probability of a die to land a certain number is 1/6 (or, in 
frequentist terms, the relative frequency of that number landing approximates 1/6) is seen 
as a physical property of the die itself (or of the entire experimental setup of throwing the 
die). This view matches the propensitic interpretation of probability. It can be assumed 
that these are analytical realistic persons, who believe in determinism, and who tend to 
relate the abstract and the empirical to unification. When basing a gambling decision on a 
physical tendency, such a gambler might not make a big distinction between probability 
and physical possibility (unless educated in this epistemic matter) and thus might 
establish a stronger personal degree of belief in the occurrence of an event than would 
other profiles, which makes him/her predisposed to gambling fallacies. For instance, s/
he might have a stronger belief in the “compensation rule” of the Martingale system, 
according to which a long series of consecutive identical outcomes should stop at some 
point sooner or later for the relative frequency to match the probability of that outcome.
The scientific interpretations of probability are just a small part of the epistemic 
knowledge attached to the concept of probability and the above examples show that 
such knowledge could influence positively a psychological methodology designed 
within problem gambling interventions. Other epistemic knowledge attached to 
other mathematical concepts from gambling mathematics may have other influences 
(especially that of expected value), but this is not the place to develop this issue; the 
point I want to make is that there exists a potential for such positive influences, which 
can be developed in the psychological practice.
Mathematical models free of gaming risk factors as objects of representation
In the process of mathematical modeling, the games are idealized through removal 
of their physical components unessential for the modeling purposes, and reduced to pure 
mathematical structures. Without such removal, the mathematical structures would not 
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be recognized any more in the investigated physical system. In such idealizations, only 
the parametric design of the game or machine is essential. This physical surplus that is 
removed includes (but is not limited to) cases, external design, interface, commands, 
motion of the mechanical components, and visual effects.
Determinants of the decision to gamble include not only the gambler’s biological 
and psychological constitution, but also the structural characteristics of the gambling 
activity itself (Griffiths, 1993). Such structural characteristics include addictive elements 
of the games – also categorized as risk factors in the literature – among which the 
near-miss effect and the illusion of control are the most important (harmful). Other less 
interactive risk factors would be the sound and image effects coming from the physical 
design of the games. Obviously, the illusion of control through a stop button (at slot 
machines) or similar devices for other types of games and sound/image effects fall 
within the physical surplus removed in the idealization required by the mathematical 
models describing the games. Regarding the near-miss effect (as well as the near-miss as 
a gaming phenomenon), it holds the same status with respect to a mathematical model. 
That is because, although the near-miss (and consequently the near-miss psychological 
effect) is a direct consequence of the parametric design of the game (yielding a relatively 
high probability of an outcome near a winning one and implicitly a high frequency of 
such event), the purposes of a probabilistic model are to provide quantifications under 
uncertainty of the winning outcomes and not particular losing ones. There are forms of 
near-miss in all games of chance. For example, in roulette, what I call a physical near-
miss is the landing of the ball on the wheel (physically) near a winning number. In that 
trivial case, the parametric configuration of the game yields the same probability of 
occurrence for any outcome, so any near-miss is not favored. Depending on the type 
of game, the parametric configuration is or is not manipulated by the game producer 
such that to yield frequent near-misses. As a manipulation example we have slots, as 
a non-manipulating one we have card games, where the near-miss is just accidental. 
In this latter case, we don’t have the same probability for all outcomes (combinations 
of cards), so some near-miss events may be more frequent than other events; however 
this situation is not created with any intention. In all cases, the near-miss event has 
no place in a probabilistic or statistical model, due to the rational arguments of the 
applied mathematician and the principle that all that is irrelevant for the modeling 
purposes is ignored, in order to have the right mathematical structures available. For 
example, a probabilistic model of a slot game will show the parametric configuration 
of the reels (number of stops and the exact distribution of symbols on each reel) and 
then the computed probabilities of the winning combinations of symbols. Nobody will 
see in this model near-miss combinations because nobody needs them; the near-miss 
combinations will hold the same status with the rest within a functional model (based on 
sets of combinations), although they have different (higher) probabilities in comparison 
to the rest of the combinations; all that count within the probabilistic model are the 
probabilities of the winning combinations. A gambler sees and is influenced by near-
miss in the real game; the gambler won’t see it in the mathematical model of that game 
if properly and effectively counseled in this matter, as well as s/he won’t see any visual 
effects or any other gaming risk factors. 
 Having the risk factors outside the mathematical models, the potential of a cognitive 
intervention based on knowledge related to mathematical models could manifest in 
both a didactical intervention – which would focus only on the mathematical facts of 
the games and induce defocus on the gaming risk factors – and a clinical intervention 
developed so as to create for the patient an objective representation of the games s/he 
plays as pure mathematical structures free of risk factors.. 
Such interventions based on the principle of reduction to models would be based 
largely on functional models, not just on the probabilistic and statistical ones, the latter 
still remaining important. The reduction-to-models principle would be a completion of 
the facing (and interpreting)-the-odds principle, and their expected positive effects on 
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decreasing excessive gambling can be tested only through empirical studies following 
this research.
 
Conclusions
In this paper I have made a structural analysis of the mathematical and epistemic 
knowledge available for gamblers, as being attached to the mathematical models of 
games of chance and the act of modeling. I have put in evidence two categories of 
these models and have shown that only one of these two has received interest from 
problem gambling researchers. I argued that considering functional models and the 
epistemic knowledge attached to gambling mathematics can enable the potential of such 
knowledge in both didactical interventions and clinical cognitive interventions, with 
respect to the aim of limiting excessive gambling.
Further research, both theoretical and empirical, is necessary in various directions for 
establishing the following:
- whether the learning principles presented are practicably applicable to gamblers, 
either didactically or clinically;
- what would be the optimal content and structure of the teaching modules and 
therapists’ modules enhanced with such principles;
- whether the potential of this non-standard knowledge will actually manifest, given 
the various levels of education of the gamblers;
- whether such knowledge can be reduced to warning messages and how such 
warning messages differ from the warning messages specific to other addictions. 
Problem gambling research has been focused from its very beginning on the 
biological/psychological make-up of the individual (Griffiths, 2009), and this is 
explainable at least partially through the fact that this domain is mainly comprised 
of medical doctors and psychologists. The proposed research moves the focus to the 
games themselves, by appealing to the unexploited potential of mathematics. Given 
that gambling is a complex domain which involves not only gamblers, but also the 
related gaming environment, the interdisciplinary research employing the full and direct 
contribution of mathematics is unavoidable. 
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